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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
CONTINENTAL THRIFT AND
LOAN COMPANY.
Plaintiff-Respondent,

vs.

Case No. 9837

]. CLYDE HUNT and
JESSE L. McCABE,
Defendants-Appellants

APPELLANTS' BRIEF
Appeal from the Judgment of the
Third District Court for Salt Lake County
Honorable Merrill A. Faux, Judge
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THAT THE ACTION OF THE PLAINTIFF AND
RESPONDENT IS BARRED BY THE EFFECT OF
TITLE 78-37-1 OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953,
AND THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT
DISMISSING THE ACTION.
POINT II.
THAT THE JUDGMENT ENTERED ON NOVEMBER 16, 1962, WAS IMPROPERLY ENTERED
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AND THAT THE LOWER COURT PROCEEDED IRREGULARLY IN ENTERING THEAFOREMENTIONED JUDGMENT INASMUCH AS COUNSEL HAD
STIPULATED THAT THE JUDGMENT \VAS TO BE
ENTERED ONLY IN THE EVENT THE FUNDS DEPOSITED TO COURT DID NOT CLEAR.
POINT III.
THAT THE AMOUNT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES
DECREED IN THE JUDGMENT ENTERED ON THE
27th DAY OF NOVEMBER, 1962, WERE UNREASONABLE AND CONSTITUTE AN ABUSE OF THE DESCRETION OF THE LOWER COURT.
POINT IV.
THAT EVEN IF THE ATTORNEY'S FEES ALLOWED BY THE LOWER COURT ARE ALLOWED
TO STAND, THE AMOUNT PAID BY THE DEFENDANT J. CLYDE HUNT ABOVE THAT AMOUNT
PRAYED FOR IN THE PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT
SHOULD CONSTITUTE A CREDIT TOWARD SAID
ATTORNEY'S FEES.
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action for collection of a sum of $5,038.64,
plus interest at the rate of ten per cent (10%) per annum
from the date of the Complaint, and for attorney's fees in
the amount of $1,800.00, and costs, on a Promissory Note
secured by a Chattel Mortgage.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was heard and tried before the Court, sitting without a jury, the Note and Chattel Mortgage were
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3
entered in evidence and the Court entered a Judgment
dated November 16, 1962 and a Judgment dated November 27, 1962 without a determination of indebtedness or
foreclosure and sale of the mortgaged property.
The Defendants appeal from:
(1) The Judgement entered in favor of the Plaintiff on the 16th day of November, 1962.
(2) The Judgment entered in favor of the Plaintiff on the 27th day of November, 1962.
(3) The Denial of Lower Court of Motion to Dismiss or for new Hearing.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON A APPEAL
Defendants seek to vacate the judgments and a dismissal of the action, or in the alternative, a modification
of the same.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On May 18, 1961, the Defendant J. Clyde Hunt, cosigned with Jesse L. McCabe on a Promissary Note in the
amount of Five Thousand Seven Hundred Sixty and No/
100 Dollars ($5,760.00) in favor of Continental Thrift and
Loan Company, the Plaintiff herein.
Simultaneously, the Co-Defendant in this action,
Jesse L. McCabe, signed an automobile chattel mortgage
on a 1950 Peterbilt six-cylinder Truck-Tractor. Defendant J. Clyde Hunt signed the Note as an accomodation, and did not sign the chattel mortgage. Jesse L.
McCabe was not served in this action.
In September, 1962, Defendant J. Clyde Hunt became
aware of a default in the payments on said Note by Jesse
L. McCabe. He also became aware that the truck pledged
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as security on said Note had been abandoned in Phoenix,
Arizona, and that there were certain charges against said
security. The Defendant J. Clyde Hunt as a co-signer
was advised that he was being looked to for payment of
the Note, and he had one discussion with one of Plaintiff's
representatives in the office of Mr. Richard Wilkins, Esquire.
On or about the 24th day of September, 1962, the
Defendant J. Clyde Hunt met with the Plaintiff's Manager in the latter's office, where Defendant J. Clyde Hunt
arranged to begin payments on the Note beginning October 8, 1962. Defendant J. Clyde Hunt was also to obtain
and return the secured truck to the State of Utah. In
order to effect the latter transaction, Defendant J. Clyde
Hunt was asked to go to the office of Gordon I. Hyde,
Esquire, Counsel for the Plaintiff, to obtain the necessary
documents for retrieving the truck.
In the office of Gordon I. Hyde, Esquire, Gordon I.
Hyde on the same day demanded a new Note and new
security, and refused to extend to the Defendant J. Clyde
Hunt, the papers needed to retreive the security. Counsel
for the Plaintiff then caused a summons to be served on
the Defendant J. Clyde Hunt on the 26th day of September, 1962.
After service of the summons on Defendant J. Clyde
Hunt, negotiations were initiated for settlement of the
claim between Counsel. Negotiations were still proceeding when the time would have expired for filing an Answer, and Counsel for the Defendant J. Clyd Hunt filed
an Answer to prevent a Default from being taken. When
the Answer for filed, Counsel for the Plaintiff withdrew
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any offer of settlement and advised that he would look to
Court for his relief.
The matter came before the Court on the Motion of
Counsel for the Plaintiff to foreclose the chattel mortgage, and upon Motion of Counsel for the Defendant J.
Clyde Hunt for determination of attorney's fees.
At the hearing of the Motion, the Defendant J. Clyde
Hunt tendered to the Court by check the amount of
$6,000.00 and stipulated in open Court that a judgment
could be entered in the event the check did not clear the
Bank.

Further hearings and testimony were taken, and the
Court awarded judgment for the Plaintiff, notwithstanding the Stipulation in open Court that judgment would
not be entered in the event the check of Defendant J.
Clyde Hunt cleared the Bank. Said judgment was entered the filed on the 16th day of November, 1962.
A further judgment was awarded the Plaintiff as
attorney's fees in the amount of $1,443.10, on the 26th
day of November, 1962.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THAT THE ACTION OF THE PLAINTIFF AND
RESPONDENT IS BARRED BY THE EFFECT OF
TITLE 78-37-1 OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953,
AND THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT
DISMISSING THE ACTION.
Title 78, Chapter 37, Section 1, states:
Form of Action · - Judgment - Special Execu
tion:
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There can be but one form of action for recovery
of any debt or the enforcement of any right secured by mortgage upon real estate or personal property, which action must be in accordance with the
provisions of this Chapter. Judgment shall be
given adjudging the amount due, with costs and
disbursements, and the sale of the mortgaged poperty, or some part thereof, to satisfy said amount
and accruing costs, and directing the Sheriff to
proceed and sell the same according to the provisions of the Law relating to sales on execution,
and a special execution or order of sale shall be
issued for that purpose.
In Stewart Livestock Co .. vs. Ostler, 105 Utah 529,
144 Pacific 2nd 276, this Court stated:
"Section 104-55, 1 and 2 require a mortgagee to
first exhaust the security before the mortgagee
can claim the right to levy on any other assets of
the debtor."
This is further affirmed by a series of cases decided
by this Court and reviewed in Zion's Savings Bank &
Trust Co. v. Rouse, et al, 86 Utah 574, 47 Pacific 2nd 617,
as follows:
" In this State there is such a statute, being R. S.
Utah 1933, 104-55-1, as follows: 'There can be but
one action for the recovery of any debt or the enforcement of any rights secured by mortgage upon real estate or personal property, which action
must be in accordance with the provisions of this
chapter.'
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The last mentioned statute has been construed by
this Court in cases which hold there can be but
one action permitted for the recovery of a debt secured by motgage. Bacon v. Raybould, 4 Utah
357, 10 Pacific 481, 11 Pacific 510. That the security must be first exhausted as to quantity and value before other property of the debtor can be resorted to for payment of the debt. Salt Lake Valley Loan & Trust Co. v. Millspaugh, 18 Utah 283,
54 Pacific 893. That the mortgaged property constitutes a primary fund or thing to which the mortgagee must first resort for the dicharge of the debt,
and until this fund has been exhausted, the mortgagee has no personal right of action against the
mortgagor unless the mortgagor consents therto.
Boucofski v. Jacobsen, 36 Utah 165, 104 Pacific
1036. 117, Jensen v. Lichtenstein, 45 Utah 320,
Pacific 1036. The Courts can impose a personal liability on the mortgagor only after having ordered
sale of the property and after sale a deficiency appears. Hammond v. Wall, 51 Utah 464, 171 Pacific
148. Howe v. Sears, 30 Utah 344, 84 Pacific 1107.
That it was the legislative intention to withhold
the right of a mortgagee to a writ of attachment or
a garnishment in cases where the debt or obligation for which the action was brought was secured
by a mortgage on property, until after sale of the
mortgaged property and the entry. of a deficiency
judgment. Blue Creek Land & Livestock Co. v.
Kehrer, 60 Utah 62, 206 Pacific 287.
From these decisions it would appear that the Plaintiff proceeding on a secured debt must proceed according
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to the Statute and that a failure to so do is a defense and
bar to judgment unless it is shown that the security has
become valueless.
The Montana Court has held in Barth v. Ely, 278
Pacific 1002:
"So long as the security has value, the only action
that will lie on the mortgaged debt is the statutory
action on foreclosure."
Further, in Lepper v. Jackson, 57 Pacific 2nd 768,
The Court states:
"The obvious purpose of the Court is to compel one
who has taken security for his debt, to exhaust his
security before resorting to the general assets of
the debtor. Such a creditor cannot waive his security and sue on the debt except by the forebearance of the debtor who may plead the mortgage as
a bar to Plaintiff's action, and it becomes such a
bar unless the Plaintiff can thereafter show that
the security through no fault of his has become
worthless."
This we take it to be the Law in jurisdictions wherein the unified form of action is set forth by statute. In
the instant case, the Plaintiff did not request in his Complaint that said mortgage he foreclosed, that a determination be made of indebtedness, that by sale, the proceeds
of said mortgage be applied to the indebtedness, with a
prayer for a judgment for any deficiency so found.
The Defendant in his answer pleads the mortgage
as a bar to any judgment until a foreclosure and execution
and sale and application of the proceeds of said sale of
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this mortgaged property may be obtained.
The Plaintiff makes the claim that the security has
become worthless, but it will be noted from the testimony
adduced at the hearing, that the Plaintiff spent a sum of
$585.00 for the preservation of such security, and prior
to initiating this action, Counsel for the Plaintiff refused
to grant to the Defendant J. Clyde Hunt documents necessary to bring the security back into the State of Utah.
Under the circumstances it would appear that the Plaintiff would be estopped from asserting a lack of value in
said security.
As the entry of any judgment in this case is contrary
to the Law hereinabove set forth, the judgments entered in the instant case on the 16th day of November,
1962, and the 27th day of November, 1962, are not in accordance with Law and should be set aside.
POINT II.
THAT THE JUDGMENT ENTERED ON NOVEMBER 16, 1962, WAS IMPROPPERLY ENTERED
AND THAT THE LOWER COURT PROCEEDED IRREGULARLY IN ENTERING THE AFOREMENTIONED JUDGMENT INASMUCH AS COUNSEL HAD
STIPULATED THAT THE JUDGMENT WAS TO BE
ENTERED ONLY IN THE EVENT THE FUNDS DEPOSIED TO THE COURT DID NOT CLEAR.
On the 9th day of November, 1962, appearing in the
District Court on the Plaintiff's Motion for Order Foreclosure and Defendant's Motion for Determination of
Attorney's Fees, Counsel for the Defendant J. Clyd Hunt
appeared in Court and the following took place, as found
on Page 9 of the record:
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MR. PACE: Excuse me, Gordon. Your Honor, my
. . client is in Court this morning and is prepared to
pay the total amount of this Note, but I would say
that in view of that fact, probably this motion of
yours is. unnecessary, Mr. Hyde. We are prepared
to offer it to Court and tender to Court the total amount of indebtedness due, Your Honor, and we
would like to have the Court determine the a·rnount of the attorney's fees due, and this would
probably: then be the :only issue before the Court.
MR. HYDE: We certainly have no objection to be..
ing paid, Your Honor.
COURT: It is always a good idea to take money
when it is available.
On Page 12 of the
tinues:

r:~cord,

the argument con-

MR. PACE: Your Honor, Mr. Hyde has essentially
stated the truth. of our position. We are willing to
pay the principal of the Note plus interest, plus the
attorney's fees they had to pay in Arizona to preserve· the security.
MR. HYDE: Your Honor, it would be simpler if
the Court simply made the order that this be paid,
and then we could prepare a judgment adding all
this in. I don't like to keep the Court here at the
noon hour.
COURT: Well, it is an accomodation to me under
some ·circumstances, today to be able to close
Court at noon, at 12:00 o'clock today.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11
MR. PACE: Your Honor, we have no objection to
leaving this here, (the check for $6,000.00), and I
am sure that we can get together with Counsel and
determine the exect amount due and owing. However, I would object to a judgment being entered
against them (Defendant J. Clyde Hunt), when
it is tendered into Court. This could of course
hurt their credit and be a problem for Mr. Hunt.
MR. HYDE: We would stipulate that the judgment could be signed and held and if full payment
is made, when the check clears and we receive
payment, why then it would not be filed. It would
be returned, if that would be agreeable.
COURT: The case then would be dismissed?
MR. HYDE: Yes.
MR. PACE: I have no objection to this, Your
Honor.
It will be noted in the above testimony that stipulation was made that a judgment would be filed in the event
the check did not clear, and payment was not received.
There is no evidence before the Court that the check did
not clear, and the Lower Court erred in entering and
filing a judgment against the Defendant J. Clyde Hunt,
based on the above referred to stipulation, because the
conditions under which said judgment would be filed did
not develop.

POINT III.
THAT THE AMOUNT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES
DECREED IN THE JUDGMENT ENTERED ON THE
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27th DAY OF NOVEMBER, 1962, WERE UNREASONABLE AND CONSTITUTE AN .ABUSE OF THE DISCRETION OF THE LOWER COURT.
In this action, had the Counsel for the Plaintiff proceeded properly, the action would have been for a mortgage foreclosure, and would therefore have been limited
by Title 78, Chapter 37, Section 9, which reads as follows:

Attorney's Fees: In all cases of foreclosures, when
an attorney's fee is claimed by the Plaintiff, the
amount thereof shall be fixed by the Court, any
stipulation to the contrary notwithstanding; provided no other or greater amount shall be allowed
or decreed than the sum which shall appear by the
evidence to be actually charged by and to be paid
to the attorney for the Plaintiff.
In the evidence submitted before the Lower Court,
there is no evidence or showing of any type that Counsel
for the Plaintiff had any agreement whatsoever with his
client for the payment of attorney's fees. In the absence
of any evidence to substantiate the same, it would appear
that the Plaintiff would be barred from receiving any attorney's fees whatsoever. It would further appear that
the Plaintiff, having failed to bring the proper type of
action, should not ·be allowed to sheild himself from this
Statute by virtue of his own improper process.
In the case· of McCormick v. Swem, 36 Utah 7, 102
Pacific 628, the Utah Court has discussed the implication
of attorney's fee on Promissary Notes, wherein it stated:

"It has frequently been held that even where the
amount has been agreed upon, it is nevertheless
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subject to control by the Courts, and therefore,
if it appears to the Court that the amount agreed
upon is unfair, unjust, or unreasonable under all
the circumstances, the same as where no amount
has been agreed upon."
This doctrine is confirmed in Banks v. Nelson, 38
Utah 169, 111 Pacific 907.
In the case of Jensen v. Lichtenstein, 45 Utah 320,
the Court discusses reasonable attorney's fees, stating:
"By a reasonable fee, no dobt is meant one which
is reasonable under all the circumstances of each
case. What is reasonable, therefore, in a large
measure, at least must depend upon the amount in
controversy, the labor and responsibility imposed
upon the attorney in obtaining judgment, as these
things may have arisen from the issues presented
and tried. If an attorney is required to do no more
than to prepare the formal proceedings and decree in a default case, a smaller sum, no doubt,
would be reasonable, than in a contested case. And
especially in one where the issues were numerous
and intricate questions of both fact and Law arose
and had to be determined. . . "
In the instant case it will be pointed out that Defendant J. Clyde Hunt attempted to negotiate a settlement
of the case prior to filing the action by Plaintiff's Counsel. That Plaintiff's Counsel filed the action immediately after having his last conversation with the Defendant
J. Clyde Hunt. The record further shows that while Defendant's Counsel was attempting to negotiate a settle-
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ment of the case and filed an Answer to prevent a default
being taken, Counsel for the Plaintiff withdrew any offer
of settlement and indicated that he would rely upon the
Court for his relief. It may further be noted that at the
first appearance in Court, the Defendant J. Clyde Hunt
made a tender of the entire amount of indebtedness, plus
the attorney's fees which were paid in the State of Arizona for preservation of the security and other costs. In
view of the prompt payment by the Defendant J. Clyde
Hunt, it would appear that the attorney's fees awarded
by the Court in the judgment of November 27th, 1962,
are excessive in the extreme for the amount of time spent
and the pleadings prepared in this case. It will be noted
that the testimony sets forth that Counsel for the Plaintiff
dedicated one and one-tenth hours (1 1/10) to this case.
There is no further testimony as to the amount of time
dedicated by Plaintiff's Counsel.
It is contended that under the circumstances, the attorney's fees set by the Court are not reasonable and constitute an abuse of the discretion of the Lower Court.
POINT IV.
THAT EVEN IF THE ATTORNEY'S FEES ALLOWED BY THE LOWER COURT ARE ALLOWED
TO STAND, THE AMOUNT PAID BY THE DEFENDANT J. CLYDE HUNT ABOVE THAT AMOUNT
PRAYED FOR IN THE PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT
SHOULD CONSTITUTE A CREDIT TOWARD SAID
ATTORNEY'S FEES.
As was repeatedly mentioned in the testimony presented before the Lower Court, the Defendant J. Clyde
Hunt did not sign, nor was he a party to the Mortgage
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Agreement of the Defendant Jesse L. McCabe and the
Plaintiff. Consequently, any expenses incurred by the
Plaintiff in the preservation of the security are not binding upon the Defendant J. Clyde Hunt. It will be noted
from the judgment filed on November 16th, 1962, that
the total amount of $741.00 was spent by the Defendant
J. Clyde Hunt either in paying bills on the security in
Arizona or in paying this amount into the Court. This
amount of $741.00 cannot in any way legally be assessed
to J. Clyde Hunt, and the same should constitute a credit
and an offset against the attorney's fees assessed by the
Court in the judgment of November 27th, 1962.
As the Court has no jurisdiction to award to the
Plaintiff a judgment in excess of the amount prayed for.
The prayer was for $5,038.64 and the judgment of November 16th, 1962, was for $5,890.54. Excluding interest and
costs of the action, this is $735.00 more than the amount
prayed for in the Plaintiff's Complaint. A further observation is made that the Plaintiff's complains. of and
requests in his Complaint, the sum of $5,038.64, plus attorney's fees. The record will show that the sum of
$6,000.00 was paid into Court.
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CONCLUSION
In summary, the judgments of November 16th, 1962,
and the November 27th, 1962, should be set asside, and
the cause remanded to the Lower Court for an order returning to the Defendant J. Clyde Hunt all sums of money
which have been remitted to the Plaintiff in excess of the
amount of indebtedness prayed for in Plaintiff's Complaint, and pursuant to the Promissory Note signed by
the Defendant J. Clyde Hunt.
Respectfully submitted,
LORIN N. PACE
19 West South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Appellant
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